The electromagnetic (EM) 
INTRODUCTION
When radios were first invented and used, access to the EM spectrum was free and open to all. However, the open spectrum concept did not continue for long. As spectrum utilization grew, so did the problem of interference. An interference victim often reacted by raising the signal power, which initiated a chain reaction among the spectrum users. It was soon realized that interference prevention is better than the interference correction approach. To enable interference prevention, governments set in place the necessary EM spectrum policies, laws, and regulations; complemented by technical standards, operational procedures, governing bodies, and enforcement mechanisms. This was the beginning of what is known now as spectrum management.
The spectrum management process determines what radio services are permitted, where, when, and under what conditions. The administrative spectrum regulations establish what portions of the spectrum will be allotted for specific radio services (spectrum allocation) and then oversee the actual designation of frequencies for use (spectrum assignment). This system works well as long as the demand for spectrum access does not exceed the supply. However, this is no longer the case and improved methods of spectrum access and spectrum management are required to meet the ever increasing demands for spectrum. Technology may help in solving the spectrum management problems. Software-based radios can allow more and more spectrum management rules to be embedded in the equipment hardware and software. For instance, the software-defined radio and cognitive radio pioneers created a vision of self-organizing radio communication networks, which could reduce the amount of external management necessary for operations. Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) has emerged in recent years as a capability that has the potential to effectively address spectrum access challenges by allowing dynamic, flexible, and autonomous spectrum access. DSA is realized through exploiting wireless networking architectures and technologies that enable wireless devices to dynamically adapt their spectrum access according to criteria such as policy constraints, spectrum availability, propagation environment, and application performance requirements. This vision has been embodied in dynamic spectrum access (DSA) research and development such as DARPA's NeXt Generation (XG) Communications program and cognitive radio concepts. Hence, fundamental changes are required in the way the Department of Defense (000) obtains and utilizes its spectrum resources to address increased spectrum demand and DSA technologies. Spectrum Access (OSA) as well as infrastructure-based Coordinated DSA, highlight their salient features, and focus on their implications on spectrum usage, radios, and networks in providing responsive, dynamic and autonomous spectrum access to the warfighter. -'''---~_ ,~_ ..T he radio modem component in Figure 2 can, and is expected to, be software-based in future implementation to enable greater flexibility to the DSA radio.
The functionality of radio modem component [3] encompasses modulation, coding, scheduling, networking, and various mobility management features. The spectrum monitor [5] provides the environmental awareness capability to the DSA radio. The driver of this component includes intelligent spectrum sensing techniques (possibly in conjunction with spectrum databases) to provide reliable detection of primary users as well as other secondary users. Finally, the policy engine component [6] [7] [8] contains rules and regulations and is equipped with policy-based mechanisms for dynamic spectrum access control.
In August 2006, at Fort A. P. Hill (Bowling Green, VA), the XG program successfully demonstrated, for the first time, a six-node network of XG radios capable of using spectrum over a wide range of frequencies on a secondary basis and adherent to the NIB [3] [4] . In this field trial, a Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) Wavesat DM256 WiMAX modem (based on the IEEE 802.I6d air interface standard) was used as the core technology for the OSA radio modem. Features supporting ad-hoc networking, automated scheduling, and mobility were not available during this field experiment.
For spectrum monitoring during the XG demonstrations at Fort A. P. Hill [5], a low-noise programmable highbandwidth energy detector, manufactured by RockwellCollins, was used to detect radio frequency (RF) signature of orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) waveform from nearby XG radios.
Similar energy detection algorithms were used to detect primary users consisting of legacy radios.
A policy-based framework for controlling spectrum access was being developed as part of the XG program [6] [7] [8] . This framework encompasses an on-channel policy engine and off-channel policy tools for policy administrators and analyzers. Two prime components of the on-channel policy engine are the Policy Conformance Reasoner, or simply, Policy Reasoner (PR), for reasoning over policies and device-provided evidence, and the System Strategy Reasoner (SSR) for adjusting and selecting the device's 
DSA ARCHITECTURES
Depending on infrastructure support, and consequently the flexibility of spectrum use, two current and distinct highlevel DSA architectures are (1) Opportunistic Spectrum Access (OSA) that is spearheading the concept of filling out spectrum holes on a non-interfering basis (NIB) without relying on a spectrum broker, and (2) Coordinated Dynamic Spectrum Access that relies on certain infrastructure including a spectrum broker as the principal component. Figure 1 , adapted from [9] , depicts the overall spectrum access taxonomy -from the current regime of static spectrum access, with the least flexible spectrum use, to the most flexible spectrum use enabled by OSA.
Opportunistic Spectrum Access (OSA)
The DARPA's XG Communications program is the main driver of DSA, and, in particular, the embodiment of the concept of OSA through concerted efforts in research, implementation, laboratory tests and field demonstrations, as well as transition to military tactical users [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] .
The basic tenet of OSA is the "Cause-No-Harm" principle: the XG radio, as a secondary user, opportunistically seeks out unoccupied spectrum ("spectrum holes") and, at the same time, avoids causing interference to primary user(s). Building on this NIB, the XG radio represents one of the evolution steps toward a truly cognitive radio. Figure 2 highlights the general architecture of the XG radio that, in turn, exemplifies the overall OSA architecture. The thr~e key functional components of an OSA radio are the radIo modem, spectrum monitor, and policy engine. As noted by the XG Communications Program, the distinguishing feature of this architecture lies in the principle that "Spectrum Management in the Radio is the Key to Enabling" dynamic spectrum sharing [1-2].
20f7 operational mode. Essentially, the SSR compiles transmission requests to be sent to PR based on sensor data from the Spectrum Monitor and its current strategies. Loaded with active policies, the PR checks each transmission request received from the SSR for policy conformance and replies to the SSR whether the transmission is approved, or disapproved, or, if the request is underspecified, which constraints must be satisfied for approval. Initial implementation of the PR provides only binary replies ("allowed" /~'not allowed"); however, future enhancements will include detailed guidance, from the PR to the SSR, for resubmitting the transmission request when it is underspecified. In addition to sending transmission requests, the SSR also sends policy update messages to the PR, and to add policies to or remove policies from the PR's active policy set.
In the recent demonstration [1] in January 2008, the XG's OSA technology continued to evolve with special emphasis on group (or collaborated, or distributed) spectrum sensing and dynamic policy management.
Planned transition of the XG technology into existing military radios is underway [1-2]. The first transition effort is targeting the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)-approved Harris Falcon III multiband, multi-mission handheld radio ANIPRC-I52, and the Thales ITRS fnhanced Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio (MBITR) (or JEM) AN/PRC-I48. The injection of XG's OSA technology into these two radios will be accomplished by way of software integration or upgrade, and without hardware modifications.
Coordinated Dynamic Spectrum Access
In the range of options for DSA depicted in Figure I , from the current static spectrum allocation and assignment on one end to the most challenging OSA at the other end, Coordinated DSA is spreading in between these two architectures [9] [10] Using the terminology of the Ofcom's DSA Candidate Architecture, DSA Network Providers operate DSA Capable Infrastructure Equipments (e.g., DSA-capable Base Stations and Access Points) that allow connections from subscribers with DSA Capable User Equipments (e.g., DSA-capable client devices such as handsets and laptops).
In this setting, the Internet provides interconnection between DSA Network Providers and DSA Service Providers, and access to services for End Users.
The major difference between the DIMSUMnet and Ofcom's DSA Candidate Architecture is the capability of the client devices in terms of frequency selection (to be brokered in a coordinated manner). In the DIMSUMnet architecture, the DIMSUM client device, as an Adaptive Cognitive Radio (ACR), has the capability to adapt based on its awareness of location and spectrum. Upon receiving, via its control channel, spectrum snapshots broadcast by the DIMSUM Base Stations in the region, the DIMSUM client device must be able to decide on the parts of a spectrum pool (that is reserved for the DIMSUMnet by regulating agencies) and application service to use according to its Quality of Service (QoS) need, power and 30f7 location constraints, as well as waveform capabilities [10] . The capability of spectrum sensing and decision making in near realtime (or, ultimately, realtime) is greatly facilitated by software-defined radio technology.
Consistent with its intention for technology agnosticity and focus on minimizing modifications required for existing networks and infrastructure, the Ofcom's DSA Candidate Architecture prefers the frequency selection capability to take place not at the client device but at the DSA Service Provider by way of a User Agent on behalf of the client device [11] . As such, the Ofcom's DSA Candidate Architecture puts the burden of implementation on the DSA Service Providers, not on client devices. This User Agent, named Price Request and Selection Agent, makes selection governed by dynamic pricing mechanisms (e.g., price versus QoS) provided by DSA Service Providers.
Overall, although Coordinated DSA architectures vary in adaptiveness requirements on client devices, the ubiquitous commonality is the use of a spectrum brokering mechanism for controlling spectrum access.
IMPLICATIONS
In this section we will discuss implications of DSA architectures on radios, networks, and spectrum usage.
DSA Implications on Radios
We will discuss three important implications of DSA architectures on radios in terms of needs for spectrum sensing, spectrum sensing security, and expressive but efficient policy language.
Spectrum Sensing
At the beginning of the development of DSA, spectrum sensing was envisioned and prototyped with emphasis on individual secondary user to provide reliable detection of primary spectrum user(s) utilizing its own spectrum measurements. Originated from Signal Processing, two widely used spectrum sensing techniques [12] [13] [14] [15] are (1) coherent pilot detection that is applicable to known primary user signals, and (2) non-coherent energy detection applicable to any signal type. The first detection technique, also called match filter, requires relatively less time to achieve high processing gain as fewer samples are required to satisfy a given detection probability constraint due to its coherency; however, the coherent pilot detection technique requires a dedicated receiver for every primary user class. On the other hand, although versatile in terms of signal types, the second detection technique requires relatively longer processing time as more non-coherent samples are required for a given detection probability constraint. In addition to this tradeoff, there are inherent drawbacks -in particular, the susceptibility to unknown or changing noise level, and the difficulty in differentiating signals, noise, and interference, that require sophisticated means for dynamic spectrum sensing for operational environments.
Using local spectrum measurements, these detection techniques often fail to overcome the well-recognized challenge in wireless networking known as the Hidden Node Problem. This problem occurs when primary users are out of range of the secondary user or obstructed by terrain variations, however the secondary user can still cause interference when using the frequencies it incorrectly detects as unoccupied. A promising solution to the Hidden Node Problem is the concept of group (or collaborative or distributed) detection for spectrum sensing where secondary users within a group share their spectrum sensing measurements and jointly decide on the presence of a primary user. A low complexity but robust decision combining technique is as follows: each secondary user sends its local detection decision in binary form (0 if signal is present, and 1 if signal is absent) to a designated secondary user, and the group decision is combined by way of the (bitwise) OR operation [14] . It is recognized that the group spectrum sensing gain is optimal under independent fading conditions. However, when secondary users are highly spatially correlated (e.g., as in indoor environments) they are likely to be blocked by common obstacles thus degrading group spectrum sensing gain.
Group spectrum sensing has become an integral part of spectrum sensing. As an example, the on-going IEEE 802.22 Cognitive Radio (CR)-based Wireless Regional Area Network (WRAN) draft specification [16] states that all customer-premises equipments (CPEs), i.e., access points, that are attached to a base station, are performing spectrum sensing and sending periodic reports to the base station that in tum will evaluate for decision on channel utilization to avoid unintentional operation on TV channels.
Spectrum Sensing Security
The need for spectrum sensing in OSA results in the need for trustworthiness in this operation.
Precisely, the security concern centers on possible attacks when a rogue secondary user emulates a primary user by transmitting signals of resembling characteristics [17] [18] . The rogue secondary user's motive in conducting this Primary User Emulation (PUE) attack can be either selfishness (to maximize its usage of certain spectrum bands) or malice (to deny other secondary users spectrum access to certain spectrum bands). In either case, the PUE attack represents a Denial of Spectrum Access to legitimate secondary users. To the extent that such threat is possible, the PUE attack can be further organized and conducted in a distributed manner by a group of rogue secondary users, 40f7 expressiveness of a policy language and the computational tractability of reasoning over policies expressed using that language is illustrated in Figure 4 . Since the classical FOL does not include types, the extension made by CoRaL allows built-in and user-defined types and subtypes, and functions and predicates defined over these types as well as constructs for numerical constraints, altogether needed in expressing specific ontologies, policies, and transmission requests for opportunistic spectrum access.
CoRaL is a departure from the policy language framework developed in Phase 2 of the XG program that was based on OWL Web Ontology Language.
CoRaL is more expressive than OWL; however, it is intended to be computationally efficient enough for reasoning and inferring to support OSA, and extensible enough for accommodating unanticipated policy types in the future [8] . Here, an observation by Brachman and Levesque on the tradeoff in a more general setting [19] [20] can be paraphrased: policy languages simply take different positions with respect to the tradeoff between expressiveness and tractability, exploring useful points along the expressiveness-tractability tradeoff curve.
DSA Implications on Networks
A positive and immediate implication of DSA on networking is that because DSA-capable radios can operate at multiple frequencies, mutual RF interference reduces as the number of nodes increases, and thus better scalability, higher bandwidth and reliability [1] [2] . In general, this notion is possible for DSA, especially, for the infrastructure-based Coordinated DSA; nevertheless, it is favorably challenging yet substantially rewarding for the infrastructure-free OSA. and the resulting impact of this Distributed Denial of Spectrum Access attach can be severely disruptive to spectrum sharing and usage. This scenario is the RF counterpart of traditional Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks that have been widespread in recent years. As a consequence, PUE attacks should be considered as an emerging and probable threat in a hostile environment.
A possible defense against PUE attacks has been proposed for the case where primary users are at fixed locations [16] . In this case, the defense measure, that uses a noninteractive transmitter verification scheme, can be integrated into the spectrum sensing mechanism.
The non-interactivity is needed to satisfy the requirement that no modification should be made to primary users in OSA. For the general setting where users, primary and secondary, are on the move, a sophisticated approach based on RF fingerprinting, that makes use of distinguishing features of intrinsic characteristics of RF signals for emitter identification typically in Electronic Warfare, might provide a technically feasible solution.
Another threat to spectrum sensing is the data falsification attack in group sensing [17] . In this attack, a rogue secondary user (or a group of rogue secondary users) may send false local spectrum sensing information, and hence may adversely affect the group detection outcome. A potential two-layer defense against spectrum sensing data falsification can make use of (1) authentication at the first layer to prevent replay or false data from outside the network, and (2) a data fusion scheme that is robust against spectrum sensing data falsification.
Policy Language
The underlying layer of a policy framework or architecture is a policy language -a language for expressing or specifying policies for the target domain. For OSA, expressed policies are intended to allow opportunistic spectrum access on the NIB principle through a reasoning process conducted by one or more reasoners. As an example, in the XG architecture, the two reasoners SSR (for transmission requests) and PR (for transmission replies) perform the policy processing in concert under the request-reply model, including interactivity between the PR and SSR in refining underspecified transmission requests.
For all practicality, central to the design a policy language is the consideration of the tradeoff between the expressiveness of the language and the computational tractability of reasoning. Clearly, a policy language with a more expressive logic is able to represent complicated policies; however, the associated computational complexity makes it less efficient in general for reasoning or inferring.
The conceptual tradeoff between the Specifically, due to the OSA's adherence to the NIB principle ("must cause no harm" to primary users), a secondary user must vacate the frequency it is using when detecting the presence of a primary user, and hops to a different frequency. To the extent that the spectrum environment is crowded and/or the network is dense (with primary and secondary users), it is likely that (I) the frequency bands are being used by (at least) other secondary users, or (2) no frequency is available because they are being occupied by primary users at that particular point in time.
In the first case, a coexistence mechanism for spectrum sharing among secondary users is needed. This is an active area of research exemplified by the on-going IEEE 802.16h that focuses on improved coexistence mechanisms for license-exempt operation for WiMAX, and the IEEE 802.22 draft specification that includes self-coexistence protocols/algorithms [16] to support the CR-based WRAN.
Although the second case may last only a short period of time, it entails a disruption in spectrum access (and an associated delay) for the secondary user. Susceptibility to disruption that renders intermittent connectivity is a common characteristic of tactical communications environments. One viable solution for adapting existing applications to disruption is to "wait it out" -not to terminate -using application-layer proxies and/or other store-and-forward delivery technologies developed for Disruption Tolerant Networking [21] [22] [23] when the radio experiences network disconnection.
As illustrated in the above discussion, directly related to the use of OSA in tactical environments is a clear need for joint management of spectrum and network at the radio (device) level. Such management convergence enables spectrum efficiency while providing adequate QoS required for running mission-critical applications on a wireless tactical communications network [24] . Similarly, for enterprise networks, this spectrum-network management convergence also benefits Coordinated DSA where smart radios are utilized as in DIMSUMnet. Additionally, it is desirable to include security management in the ultimate management convergence.
The XG program demonstrates that policy-based spectrum management at the radio level is able to provide a single, simple means for spectrum controls with flexibility and robustness [6] [7] [8] [9] . Policy-based management has also been explored and applied separately to networking (see, for examples, [25] [26] ) and security [27] with striding progress and promising results.
A unified policy-based management of spectrum, network, and security at the radio level is necessary and effective in joint delivering of comprehensive, adaptive, and corrective actions according to spectrum, network and security states.
3.3 DSA Implications on Spectrum Usage DSA architectures have offered new avenues for improving access and usage of the RF spectrum. In light of ever-increasing demands placed on the limited spectrum supply, there is a strong and present need to foster and promote new spectrum enhancing capabilities.
To provide a structured evaluation approach for interrelated, but often intractable, issues of spectrum efficiency and operational effectiveness of technologies and systems, the Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) of the Defense Spectrum Organization (DSO) is developing a Spectrum Scorecard analytical framework. This systemsengineering methodology is intended to facilitate tradeoff considerations of spectrum efficiency, effectiveness, and supportability for better integrating planning into spectrum-dependent system acquisition [28] . In particular, not only the Spectrum Scorecard analytical framework considers the Physical Domain trade space with traditional dimensions, namely time, space, frequency, and power, it also examines the Logical Domain trade space that focuses on networking, and information and knowledge processing, as well as the Hybrid Domain that is the intersection of the Physical Domain and Logical Domain. An initial prototype of the Spectrum Scorecard analytical framework has been developed by the JSC. The structure of the prototype aligns Capabilities in accordance with trade space dimensions (e.g., the Frequency Management capacity is aligned to the Frequency dimension of the Physical Domain, and the Knowledge Management capability to the Information/Language dimension of the Logical Domain). Each Capability is composed of a set of Attributes that primarily affects the associated trade space dimension. For example, a generalization of Dynamic Frequency Selection (DFS) known as Frequency Selection (for selecting an appropriate channel based on some specific condition such as signal strength, electromagnetic environment, and mission requirements) and Frequency Diversity (for leveraging the Frequency dimension to average out the effects of interference and propagation leading to improvements in the signal-to-interference ratio performance of a spectrum-dependent device) are among the attributes of the Frequency Management capability. Details of the general approach and structure of the prototype, as well as descriptions of capabilities and attributes are available in [28] .
The Spectrum Scorecard is intended to be flexible, amenable, and is expected to be tailored by the applying agency. Furthermore, it is expected to serve at different levels of research, development, and acquisition to support the design of efficient and effective communications systems within the DoD to provide responsive tactical and enabling strategic capabilities to the warfighter. 60f7 4. CONCLUSION Dynamic Spectrum Access is the key enabling driver of next-generation wireless networks. We presented an overview of the two architectures: the infrastructure-free Opportunistic Spectrum Access suitable for military tactical communications., and the infrastructure-based Coordinated Dynamic Spectrum Access tailored for enterprise networks.
We highlighted their salient features and implications on radios., networks., and spectrum usage. In particular., on the radio side., we focused on needs for spectrum sensing., spectrum sensing security., and expressive but efficient policy language; on the network side., disruption tolerant networking technologies as well as the need for a unified policybased management convergence of spectrum., network., and security. Finally., we identified the JSC Spectrum Scorecard as a possible structured evaluation approach for tradeoff considerations related to spectrum usage.
